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Karl Magnus Johansson  
Europarties – A Research Note  
This paper outlines and elaborates the role of Europarties in the political 
system of the European Union (EU), addressing their key features and the 
extent to which they carry agency. By “Europarties” I mean the extra-
parliamentary organisations in the EU outside the European Parliament 
(EP), rather than the political groups therein. It bears noting, however, that 
the Europarties emerged from the EP groups. Among the Europarties, the 
centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and the centre-left Party of 
European Socialists (PES) are the most important ones. Key players in and 
across these two Europarties have contributed to the fundamental change in 
the EU political and institutional environment, in which the Europarties 
themselves exist. 
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in Europarties, as 
they have become increasingly institutionalised and sought to raise their 
profile within the institutional framework of the EU1. But despite their 
organisational development and role in EU politics, Europarties remain 
under-researched and underestimated. Whilst there seems to be an enduring 
 
1  Külahci, E., “Europarties: Agenda-Setter or Agenda-Follower? Social democracy 
and the disincentives for tax harmonization”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
48 (5), 2010: 1283–1306; Van Hecke, S., “Do Transnational Party Federations 
Matter? (… and Why Should We Care?)”, Journal of Contemporary European 
Research, 6 (3), 2010: 395–411 and “Polity-Building in the Constitutional 
Convention: Transnational Party Groups in European Union Institutional Reform”, 
50 (5), 2012: 837–852; Poguntke, T./Morlok, M.,/Merten, H. (eds.), Auf dem Weg 
zu einer europäischen Parteiendemokratie, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013; Stetter, 
E./Duffek, K./Skrzypek, A. (eds.), In the Name of Political Union – Europarties on 
the Rise, Brussels: FEPS, 2013; Acta Politica, Special Issue: Europarties between 
‘deepening’ and ‘widening’, 49 (1), 2014. 
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resilience to the idea that Europarties matter, it is all the more relevant to 
look now at Europarties as they have attempted to establish themselves. In 
this connection, a key question is how Europarties actually operate and co-
ordinate policy among the national member parties. And how they seek to 
exert influence in the EU – and what impact they could have2. Against this 
background, it is a good time now to look at the Europarties. They have 
developed a form of party organisation with a supranational party structure. 
There is a gradual institutionalisation of Europarties and party families. 
Still, there is an important gap in our understanding and knowledge 
concerning Europarties. To some extent, Europarties are actors in their own 
right and not merely entities or arenas to be acted upon or through by 
national member parties (in government or in opposition). Yet, they have 
seldom been treated as independent actors carrying “agency”, that is, 
having capacity to act on their own.  
What role do Europarties play in the EU? How can we explain them? Why 
and to what extent do they co-operate? What are the motivations driving 
their choice to co-operate? These are the questions of this paper, which 
seeks to clarify the role of Europarties with an account of general patterns 
of interaction and opportunities, explaining why national political parties 
have chosen to act together and organise collectively on a transnational 
scale. As a research note the paper thereby aims at highlighting Europarties 
and their role, illuminating important general issues and seeking to 
contribute to future research. 
The questions are also applicable to the role of Europarties in processes of 
EU treaty reform, which have resulted in wide-ranging constitutional and 
institutional changes since the mid-1980s and in a vast literature. This 
literature largely overlooks the role of Europarties, only rarely addressing 
their role or the party political dimension more broadly in successive treaty 
 
2  Raunio, T., “Political Parties in the European Union”, in: Jørgensen, K.E./Pollack, 
M.A./Rosamond, B. (eds.), Handbook of European Union Politics, London: SAGE, 
2006: 247–262.; Lord, C., “The aggregating function of political parties in EU 
decision-making”, Living Reviews in European Governance, 5 (3), 2010. 
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reforms or negotiations3. Europarties have contributed to EU treaty reform. 
They are a driving force behind European integration.  
Whereas political parties often are seen as being on the decline at the 
national level, they take on partly new roles when combining into 
transnational associations and emerging as actors in a policy-making 
context beyond the nation state. We are dealing here with boundary actors 
and key activists who handle inputs into the policy process by operating 
through transnational transmission systems at the interface between the 
national and the European. 
Why are political parties formed in the first place? Beyond ideology, the 
short, and rationalist, answer is that they are formed to increase prospects 
for winning desired outcomes. Accordingly, they have good reason to seek 
to get their acts together in order to increase their leverage. Drawing on 
general theories of party behaviour, political parties can be treated as 
adaptive and purposive. As strategic actors they can be expected to seek to 
fulfil certain goals – cohesion in the internal arena, influence in the 
parliamentary arena and votes in the electoral arena4. Political parties can 
be conceived of as office-seeking, policy-seeking, or vote-seeking 5 . 
Moreover, if anything, parties are information-seeking. Information is a 
vital power resource. Ultimately, political parties are power-seeking. 
 
3  For rare contributions, see Budden, P., The Making of the Single European Act: the 
United Kingdom and the European Community: 1979–1986, unpublished thesis 
presented to Faculty of Modern History at the University of Oxford, 1994; Budden, 
P., “Observations on the Single European Act and ‘relaunch of Europe’: a less 
‘intergovernmental’ reading of the 1985 Intergovernmental Conference”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 9 (1), 2002: 76–97; Johansson, K.M., “Tracing the 
Employment Title in the Amsterdam Treaty: Uncovering Transnational Coalitions”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 6 (1), 1999: 85–101; Johansson, K.M., 
“Another Road to Maastricht: The Christian Democrat Coalition and the Quest for 
European Union”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (5), 2002 (a): 871–893; 
Johansson, K.M., “Party Elites in Multilevel Europe: The Christian Democrats and 
the Single European Act”, Party Politics, 8 (4), 2002 (b): 423–439; Lightfoot, S., 
Europeanizing Social Democracy? The rise of the Party of European Socialists, 
London: Routledge, 2005; Van Hecke, S. (2012), op. cit. 
4  Sjöblom, G., Party Strategies in a Multiparty System, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1968. 
5  Müller, W.C./Strøm, K., (eds.), Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in 
Western Europe Make Hard Decisions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999. 
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Political parties can be assumed to be policy-seekers seeking to influence 
policy outcomes. Like parties at the national and subnational levels, 
Europarties, in the EU context, seek to have a direct input into the policy 
debate and agenda by playing a policy-influencing role and thus be policy-
seeking6. 
In a nutshell, parties are instruments for collective action and 
policymaking, interest aggregation, and conflict resolution. Political parties 
are formed as institutional solutions to handle an internal collective action 
problem within or outside the legislature – to reduce the transactions costs 
of collective decision-making and coalition building7. Building a coalition 
requires effort and time and therefore involves transaction costs. Coalitions 
are a central feature of both domestic and international politics and serve to 
pool power and enhance the chances of influence over outcomes for 
individual actors and help to simplify the process of bargaining for the 
collective of actors8. Given this basic demand for co-operation the same 
logic applies to both national and transnational parties, which also are 
formed and maintained in order to influence policy and reduce transaction 
costs. As Lindberg et al. 9 note the formation of transnational parties is 
[…] in the interest of legislators because political parties reduce the 
transactions costs of legislative decision-making and increase their 
influence over policy outcomes […]. Since their legislative influence can 
only be maintained if transnational parties vote cohesively, legislators 
have a rationale for establishing a centralized party leadership which 
monitors the compliance of party members and sanctions them 
accordingly. 
 
6  e.g., Johansson, K.M./Zervakis, P.A. (eds.), European Political Parties between 
Cooperation and Integration, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002.; Külahci, E., 
“Theorizing party interaction within European party federations and their effects on 
the EU policy-making process”, European Integration online Papers, 6 (16), 2002; 
Lightfoot (2005), op. cit.; Van Hecke (2010), op. cit.; Acta Politica, op. cit. 
7  Aldrich, J.H., Why Parties? A Second Look, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011. 
8  Tallberg, J./Johansson, K.M., “Party Politics in the European Council”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 15 (8), 2008: 1224. 
9  Lindberg, B./Rasmussen, A./Warntjen, A., “Party politics as usual? The role of 
political parties in EU legislative decision-making”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 15 (8), 2008: 1113. 
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National parties and their leaderships may use Europarty networks 
instrumentally for lowering transaction costs when acting and interacting in 
the EU. Europarties serve as a tool for reducing transaction costs for 
member parties for whom on-going co-ordination with so many other 
parties would be nearly impossible on a unilateral basis. The PES network 
“has been indispensable for lowering transaction costs for individual 
parties”10. Likewise, the EPP provides a kind of network and co-ordination 
function. As Hanley11 notes: “Co-ordination is a more useful concept for 
understanding the EPP than supra-nationalism.” The then EPP secretary-
general Welle also underlined this function of co-ordination: 
Our key role is coordination and the bringing together of the main 
players such as the Commission, national governments, national 
leaderships and party presidents. That coordination and the construction 
of a joint political identity are important. The function of a European 
political party is to bind forces together so they can be a major player in 
the European Parliament [...] 12  
In an author interview, Welle said that in order not to be “lonely” in the 
European Council “you need coalition-building in advance” and to “play in 
a team” – even the German chancellor – and that this is “the major 
justification of the EPP”; as a “meeting place” and that “co-ordination is 
necessary in advance” of European Council meetings. To this end, 
Europarties such as the EPP and PES organise party summits of 
government and party leaders before European Council summits, but also 
hold conclaves independent of the European Council13. Europarty summits 
have been increasingly institutionalised and serve different functions: elite 
 
10  Ladrech, R., Social Democracy and the Challenge of European Union, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2000: 127. 
11  Hanley, D., “The European People’s Party: towards a new party form?”, in Hanley, 
D. (ed.), Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective, London: 
Pinter Publishers, 1994: 195; see also Hanley, D., Beyond the Nation State: Parties 
in the Era of European Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
12  Quoted in European Voice, 11–17 July 1996. 
13  The EPP has organised summits regularly since 1983, first as the EPP Conference 
of Party Leaders and Heads of Government, then, from late 1995, as the EPP 
Summit, see Jansen, T., The European People’s Party: Origins and Development, 
Brussels: European People’s Party, 2006: ch. 9. 
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networking, intra-party decision-making, soft policy co-ordination, bilateral 
contacts, and media performance14. 
The main purpose of such institutionalised networking is to discuss items 
on the agenda, develop strategies, and – whenever possible – hammer out a 
common line. In addition to the leaders of the Europarty and of member 
parties, whether in government or in opposition, prime ministers or other 
ministers representing the member parties, the participants at these pre-
summit meetings include people from the corresponding group in the EP 
and from the Commission. The influence and effectiveness of the 
Europarties depend on their capacity to mobilise “their” heads of 
government for the party cause. The party summits are a central aspect of 
this mobilisation process. However, their significance appears to vary over 
time and across party families. There are instances when party political 
mobilisation through Europarties and their summit meetings has been 
decisive for decision-making in the European Council15. Yet, there is also 
evidence that a lack of commitment to these meetings among individual 
heads of government has reduced their significance, which “depends 
strongly on incumbency” and this is why PES meetings did not function 
particularly well in the late 1990s and the early 2000s16. Specifically, Tony 
Blair and Gerhard Schröder showed little inclination to attend. They 
apparently saw the PES pre-summit meetings as a waste of time. Their 
instinct was to see exclusively other “chief executives”. The EPP has 
confronted fewer problems in securing the participation of its heads of 
government at pre-summit meetings. A reason for this is the commitment 
 
14  Van Hecke, S./Johansson, K.M., “Gipfelpolitik politischer Parteien auf 
europäischer Ebene: eine vergleichende Analyse”, in: Poguntke, T./Morlok, 
M./Merten, H. (eds.), Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Parteiendemokratie, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013: 175–190; Van Hecke, S./Johansson, K.M., “Summitry 
of Political Parties at European Level: The Case of the PES Leaders’ Conference”, 
in: E. Stetter,/Duffek, K./Skrzypek, A. (eds.), In the Name of Political Union – 
Europarties on the Rise, Brussels: FEPS, 2013: 62–76. 
15  Hix, S./Lord, C., Political Parties in the European Union, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1997; Johansson (1999, 2002a, 2002b), op. cit. 
16  Poguntke, T., “Europeanization in a consensual environment? German political 
parties and the European Union”, in: Poguntke, T. et al. (eds.), The 
Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and organizational 
adaptation, London: Routledge, 2007: 108–133. 
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on the part of the German CDU and its leaders. Two German Christian 
Democrat chancellors, Helmut Kohl and Angela Merkel, have used 
Europarty structures for the purpose of building up a European network17. 
But while the EPP has been able to secure the participation of its heads of 
government at pre-summit meetings, participation is not all, as limits in the 
ambition and capacity to co-ordinate positions may reduce the influence of 
the Europarties as well. Nor was, and is, the EPP really able to impose its 
views and any decisions on the outcome of a specific European Council 
summit. As John Bruton, former prime minister of Ireland, testifies:  
These discussions [at EPP summits] were useful in preparing for the 
subsequent heads of Government meetings between all of the members. 
The meetings gave a particularly good insight into the thinking of 
Chancellor Kohl, who tended to lead the discussions within the EPP. The 
EPP meetings did not, however, take any decisions or give any directions 
as to “EPP policy” at the subsequent formal heads of Government 
meeting. The only occasion that I recollect anything remotely of that 
character happening was when we discussed a particular appointment to 
a job.18 
Only rarely were resolutions and minutes taken at party summits made 
public. Especially in the light of European Council meetings “it was not in 
the interests of government leaders to be tied down; they needed to retain 
as free a hand as possible in their discussions with other government 
leaders”19. Europarties are unable to tie the hands of national government 
leaders in the negotiations. At this level the Europarties have no formal 
powers to take binding decisions. The most high-profile forum of the 
Europarties – the party leaders meetings – only goes as far as issuing 
resolutions and recommendations and decisions are not binding in the sense 
that sanctions can be levied against any member party that fails to 
implement them20. Arguably, Europarties are essentially transnational co-
ordinating mechanisms for like-minded parties that wish to “upload” policy 
ideas and transmit them to other parties rather than being a locus of 
 
17  Ibid, 125. 
18  Personal letter to the author, dated 14 August 1997. 
19  Jansen, op. cit., 109.  
20  Carter, E./Ladrech, R., “Government change, organizational continuity: The limited 
Europeanization of British political parties”, in: Poguntke et al., op. cit, 57–85. 
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important decision-making21 . A case in point is the way in which the 
Swedish social democrats used their contacts in the PES to push a domestic 
policy priority, the fight against unemployment, which was subsequently 
included in the Amsterdam Treaty in the form of special title for 
employment22. This could occur thanks to the partisan swing in favour of 
the PES. Numerically dominating the European Council in the second part 
of the 1990s, the socialists championed the establishment of the 
employment title in the new treaty. This is generally considered an example 
of successful transnational party politics, of a truly transnational policy 
contribution23. 
In this vein, Europarties can be expected to matter (more) when they are in 
numerical ascendance. One clear conclusion from previous research is that 
the Europarties are able to influence decisions in the European Council 
when political leaders from one distinct party family outnumber those from 
other party families24. With special reference to the EPP, Van Hecke25 
emphasises that the impact and effectiveness of the strategy of the meetings 
of Christian Democratic Party elites on agenda setting, timetable and 
content of treaties is “dependent on the quality and quantity of the Christian 
Democratic presence in the European Council.” EPP profited from its 
relative majority in the European Council up to the 1990s, when Christian 
Democrat party elites “to a large extent shaped the politics and policies”26. 
Numerical strength or superiority of a Europarty and party family alone is 
not a sufficient condition for influencing political outcomes in the 
European Council along party political lines. In addition, the heads of 
government of a particular Europarty must be mobilised for the joint cause. 
An increased volume of Europarty summitry “may be a necessary 
condition for influencing EU decision-making, but it is not sufficient by 
 
21  Ibid., 80. 
22  Johansson (1999), op. cit. 
23  Johansson (1999), Ladrech (2000), Külahci (2002, 2010), Lightfoot (2005), op. cit. 
24  e.g., Johansson (1999, 2002a, 2002b), op. cit. 
25  Van Hecke, S., “Christian Democratic Parties and Europeanisation”, in: Van 
Hecke, S./Gerard, E. (eds.), Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End 
of the Cold War, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004: 49–50. 
26  Ibid., 50. 
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itself”27. As Hix28 notes with regard to party influence generally in the EU, 
“[…] translation from party strengths to policy outputs requires party actors 
in the same party family to cooperate, and winning coalitions to be 
constructed between different party families.” 
So, arguably, Europarties are more likely to influence the process and 
outcome of negotiations in the European Council the greater the dominance 
of one particular Europarty, that is, the relative strength of the party 
families, as well as the greater their cohesion and capacity for 
mobilisation29. Exploring party politics in the European Council theoretic-
cally and empirically, Tallberg and Johansson30 note that the theoretical 
hypotheses advanced “may be refined to incorporate other factors, such as 
the domestic political context of heads of government (majority/minority 
government, coalition/one party government).”  
The cohesion, mobilisation and influence of Europarties are conditioned on 
factors pertaining to domestic politics. As Hanley 31  reminds us, with 
special reference to the EPP, even though the group of national leaders – 
party and governmental – happen to agree about very fundamental aspects 
of policy and consult regularly, “these leaders remain first and foremost 
national politicians, responsible to national electorates.” Arguably, this 
concern with domestic politics and constituencies is the central factor 
restraining Europarty influence. Essentially nation-bound institutions, 
rooted in national societies and social cleavages and issue dimensions, 
political parties are likely to give priority to concerns at the domestic 
arenas of party politics rather than at the European ones. It is difficult to 
create a unitary command and control structure within Europarties as they 
are federative “parties of parties”, consisting of national member parties. 
Accordingly, it is essential to take domestic politics into account when 
exploring not only how governments but also parties act in the EU. 
Notably, domestic institutions for (treaty) ratification must be accounted 
 
27  Hix/Lord, op. cit., 186.  
28  Hix, S., The Political System of the European Union, 2nd edn., Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005: 187. 
29  Tallberg/Johansson, op. cit., 1222–1242. 
30  Ibid., 1238. 
31  Hanley, 1994, op. cit., 197; see also Hanley, 2008. 
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for. However powerful heads of government may be in their role, they have 
not full control over the domestic context in which they operate. This also 
alerts us to the interplay between government and opposition, the inherent 
conflict between them, and the party-political battles that break out as a 
consequence, as well as to intra-government divisions.  
In sum, the conditions for influence of Europarties are demanding. They 
must exhibit a certain degree of cohesion on the internal arena. The sheer 
numbers, the numerical strength, of Europarty presence in EU institutions 
is not a sufficient condition; there must also be effective mobilisation. 
There are domestic constraints on national parties and leaders that 
constitute important limits to Europarty influence. 
In any event, the institution of the party summits is clearly one of the most 
significant characteristic feature and role of Europarties. These summit 
meetings have taken on an unprecedented importance and become the 
networking forum for European political leaders, with as much to be gained 
and discussed behind the scenes as on the formal agenda. Europarty 
summits have a role in oiling the wheels of the negotiations by giving a 
preferred line of action and by bringing together the main political players 
and cultivating personal relationships and trust. As Garret FitzGerald, 
another former prime minister of Ireland, noted in an author interview 
personal relationships could “mitigate” relationships between governments, 
where for him the Christian Democrat grouping offered an “extra chance” 
to shape policies in a way “helpful to you”. 
National parties and their leaders, even prime ministers, may use the 
Europarties to promote their own agenda. In general, national political 
parties and elites use Europarties as a clearing-house for developing joint 
policies, and a means for reducing transaction costs when acting in the EU. 
Through institutionalised summitry Europarties could contribute to and 
affect policy agendas and outcomes in EU decision-making.  
Europarties thus play a role in inter-institutional decision-making in the 
EU. The major Europarties are linked to EU institutions, notably the EP 
and the corresponding groups therein. Europarties also provide a forum for 
discussing appointments to important jobs in EU institutions, such as the 
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Commission and the EP. Furthermore, they work out political programmes 
or action programmes for their corresponding party group, and common 
manifestos for European elections. They adopt common policies in a 
number of areas, often through regular or ad hoc working groups, which 
cover major policy areas. Continuously, there is exchange of views and 
information, information sharing. Moreover, there appears to be a pressure 
on the people delegated to working groups, for example, to reach a 
consensus. Alongside the formal decisions, therefore, particular 
deliberations and agreements may well have a kind of norm-shaping impact 
on member parties, and thus an influence over politics at the national level. 
Key activists in Europarties play an important role as norm or policy 
entrepreneurs32. In order to fulfil their function an organisation like the EPP 
has the task of bringing a European perspective to the issues and thereby 
make people see the policy options from new angles as well as of bringing 
together a network of political decision-makers. They are engaged in actor 
socialisation, at elite level, and this may lead to change in attitudes and 
preferences and to a reorientation of previous positions. Gatherings within 
transnational EU party families may socialise party officials and politicians 
in a manner that affects subsequent political choices 33 . An intriguing 
question is to what extent such socialising facilitates political action and 
decision-making.  
In sum, Europarties serve a number of purposes and functions. Europarties 
serve as transnational co-ordinating mechanisms for like-minded parties. 
Clearly, they fulfil a co-ordinating function: they promote the sharing and 
exchange of information, knowledge and experience; and they play an 
important role in facilitating and institutionalising networks34. They are 
actors within the political system of the EU35. They have a hand in the 
decision- or policy-making process, and they are a driving force behind 
European integration. Decision-making and networking provide political 
 
32  e.g., Johansson (1999), op. cit. 
33  Ladrech (2000), op. cit. 
34  e.g., Ladrech (2000) op. cit.; Ladrech, R., “The European Union and political 
parties”, in: Katz, R.S./Crotty, W. (eds.), Handbook of Party Politics, London: 
SAGE, 2006: 492–498. 
35  Hix (2005), op. cit. 
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functions in their own right. There is a need for such party networks in EU 
politics. Most political parties within and throughout the EU are now linked 
into transnational networks that provide opportunities for access and 
influence36. So national parties form transnational alliances and Europarties 
in particular to maximise their influence in the Union. Transnationally and 
supranationally engaged, Europarties seek to maximise their influence by 
attempting to shape decision-making and policy outcomes within the EU 
polity. To this end, there are Europarty attempts at mobilisation and 
influence.  
The Europarties have clearly been assigned a more important role in the 
EU’s political system. Constitutional and legal rules recognise the role of 
Europarties in the Union. Since 2004 the Europarties are allocated funds 
from the EU’s budget, as a result of the new rules regarding funding for 
such parties37. It seems that the main motivation for political forces to 
found Europarties since 2004 has been the new financial resources that 
become available thereby. Arguably, Europarties would become more 
institutionalised as a result of this funding. As Bartolini wrote in reference 
to the 2003/2004 regulation38:  
As a result of the need to formalize the conditions of financing and of 
operational survival, the organization of political parties may experience 
a further institutionalization moving from the current network form to a 
more hierarchical and authoritative organization at the EU level. 
Europarties may become more organized because this is the only way to 
legally obtain the money they need to survive. 
 
36  e.g., Johansson, K.M., Transnational Party Alliances: Analysing the Hard-Won 
Alliance between Conservatives and Christian Democrats in the European 
Parliament, Lund: Lund University Press, 1997. 
37  See, e.g., Johansson, K.M./Raunio, T., “Regulating Europarties: Cross-Party 
Coalitions Capitalizing on Incomplete Contracts”, Party Politics, 11 (5), 2005: 
515–534.; Johansson, K.M., “The Emergence of Political Parties at European 
Level: Integration Unaccomplished”, in: Gustavsson, S./Oxelheim, L./Pehrson, L. 
(eds.), How Unified Is the European Union? European Integration Between Visions 
and Popular Legitimacy, Heidelberg: Springer, 2009: 157–178; Poguntke et al., op. 
cit.; Acta Politica, op. cit. 
38  Bartolini, S., Restructuring Europe: Centre formation, system building, and 
political structuring between the nation state and the European Union, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005. 
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With the revised regulation in place, the life of the Europarties entered a 
new stage. For example, it allows them to campaign in European elections. 
Arguably, Europarties have become more autonomous vis-à-vis their 
member parties and vis-à-vis their respective groups in the EP. The 
additional funding they have obtained serves to reduce their dependence on 
the member parties. In the past, the development of Europarties has been 
hampered by their dependence on their national members for resources. It 
has happened that an individual party has threatened to withdraw its 
membership subscription. The new circumstances in which the Europarties 
find themselves could promote a more independent position. But it remains 
an open question as to whether, and to what extent, the Europarties will 
assume a more significant role and develop into more hierarchical 
organisations. Politicisation in the EU along left/right lines and around 
high-salience issues and institutions will encourage national parties to co-
ordinate their policies further. The result will be greater policy co-
ordination across the EU institutions and a more central role for 
Europarties.  
Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the EP has been empowered 
further. The co-decision procedure is the standard mode for the making of 
EU laws. There is a clearer link between EP elections and the composition 
of the Commission, which will inevitably become more partisan in 
character. Tendencies toward parliamentarism strengthen the partisan 
dimension of EU politics. These changes, together with the constitutional 
regulation of Europarties, will most likely lead to closer policy co-
ordination between Europarties and their respective parliamentary groups. 
But that remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the prominence of the European 
Council has generated functional pressure for co-ordination in advance of 
its regular summits. As the supreme political body of the EU composed of 
the heads of government of the member states and the president of the 
Commission, the European Council constitutes the site for bargaining over 
policy, institutional reform, etc. All major decisions in the EU nowadays go 
through the European Council in some shape or form. At this the highest 
political level, it has proved useful for heads of government to get together 
before European Council summits, and the party networks can then be used 
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through different ways of developing consensus and seeking solutions to 
the main political issues raised, thereby making it possible for the 
negotiations to advance toward conclusion.  
National parties – whether in government or opposition – recognise the 
functional necessity to organise collectively in the EU, for purposes of 
allowing them and their politicians to exert influence there. The growth in 
EU powers – to which elites in Europarty circles thus have contributed – 
has presented parties with functional pressures for the transnational 
engagement. More broadly, transnational parties can be seen as alliances of 
national parties encouraged to join forces to gain political strength through 
collective action and intensive transnational collaboration, through 
interaction between key decision-makers in the EU.  
It will behove future researchers on Europarties to examine the extent to 
which, and the conditions under which, Europarties are able to influence 
the EU policy process. Moreover, they should examine the possible role of 
Europarties in democratising the EU, in linking citizens to the Union, and 
in strengthening the means by which political and bureaucratic elites can be 
held accountable for their decisions. Champions of the role of Europarties, 
including key activists in Europarty circles, tend to emphasise the 
contribution Europarties can make to the democratisation of the EU39. 
Strengthened Europarties, operating under the provisions of a European 
party statute, have also been thought helpful for enhancing the Union’s 
popular legitimacy. This reflects the belief that they would help citizens 
become politically active. The European political foundations, which are 
linked to the Europarties, are designed to get people talking about issues 
that affect citizens across Europe. Arguably, party politicisation in the EU 
could mobilise citizens and enhance its democratic legitimacy. It is in this 
context and bigger picture that Europarties have a role to play. They could 
contribute to strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union through 
increased politicisation on the basis of alternative ideological preferences 
and more open political competition, especially along left/right lines. 
Political parties are essential if such politicisation is to come about. A party 
 
39  e.g., Hix, S., What’s Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, 
Cambridge: Polity, 2008. 
Europarties – A Research Note 
 
15 
 
system is something of a cornerstone in a European political community, 
imagined or real. It is critical for conflict management, for political debate 
on specific issues, and for the development of a European public space and 
problem-solving capacity. Effective Europarties could enhance the Union’s 
capacity for action, thus strengthening the Union’s legitimacy among its 
citizens.  
The contest in the 2014 EP elections between candidates from different 
Europarties to become President of the European Commission, based on 
political platforms, brought an element of increased contestation over the 
polity, politics and policy of the EU. A scenario of democratic majority 
rule at the European level as well as of “escalation of transnational 
conflicts” could be envisaged40. Their new role as campaign organisations 
may lead to an increased politicisation of the EU, and help to make them 
more visible at the national level. At the same time, however, Europarties 
are still reliant on national parties for their development; national parties, in 
turn, are accountable to national constituencies. And national parties want 
to run their own election campaigns and determine their own policies. In 
the constitutional and institutional order that currently exists, there are 
clearly disincentives for national parties to strengthen the Europarties 
further. Insofar as Europarties become more relevant and influential, 
therefore, they are likely to be placed under stricter supervision by their 
member parties. This could hamper their further development. In general, 
national parties are careful to maintain the greatest possible autonomy, and 
they are unwilling to subordinate themselves to their supranational 
counterparts. It is therefore difficult to achieve a full-fledged integration of 
political parties on a European scale.  
In conclusion, this paper carries implications for research on the EU 
including constitutional and institutional aspects, the evolution of the EU 
and its political system more broadly, the role of Europarties as well as 
national parties in that system, and in democratising the EU. This paper 
suggests a need to take Europarties seriously. They merit greater attention. 
Europarties are still insufficiently understood and deserve further research. 
 
40  Scharpf, F.W., No Exit from the Euro-Rescuing Trap?, MPIfG (Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies) Discussion Paper, No. 4, 2014. 
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